The Debate over the Nature of Motion: John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony. With an edition of John Buridan's Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, secundum ultima lecturam, Book III, q.17. by Thijssen, J.M.M.H.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-08 and may be subject to
change.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI : 10.1163/157338209X425551
Early Science and Medicine 14 (2009) 186-210 www.brill.nl/esm
e Debate over the Nature of Motion: 
John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony. 
With an Edition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super 
libros Physicorum, secundum ultimam lecturam, 




e so-called ‘Buridan school’ at the University of Paris has obtained a considerable 
fame in the history of science. Pierre Duhem had made some bold claims about the 
achievements by John Buridan and his ‘pupils’ Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony 
in the ﬁeld of medieval dynamics. Although generally, Duhem’s views are no longer 
accepted, the idea of a ‘Buridan school’ has survived. is idea is, however, misleading. 
John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony should rather be viewed as mem-
bers of an intellectual network. While interested in similar philosophical themes and 
understanding each other’s conceptual language, they also disagreed about numerous 
topics. One case in point is the nature of motion, as discussed in their respective Ques-
tions on the Physics. Despite the common features of the language in which they discuss 
motion, the three thinkers defend diﬀerent positions. is article compares the three 
sets of Questions on the Physics and presents a critical edition of Buridan’s “ultima lec-
tura”, Book III, q. 7.
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ere was no such thing as the Buridan school, and this is a paper 
about it.1 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Pierre Duhem 
(1861-1916) announced the existence of the Buridan school and 
attributed a pivotal role to it in making science modern. He pushed 
the origin of modern science back to the fourteenth century and 
claimed that the University of Paris was its location: “La Faculté 
des Arts de Paris allait enfanter la Science moderne.”2 One of his 
most celebratory statements of the role of Paris and of Buridan can 
be found in the preface to his Études sur Léonard de Vinci. He there 
went even further and claimed that Christian faith had vanquished 
both pagan Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism:
Cette substitution de la Physique moderne à la Physique d’Aristote a résulté d’un 
eﬀort de longue durée et d’extra-ordinaire puissance. Cet eﬀort, il a pris appui sur 
la plus ancienne et la plus resplendissante des universités médiévales, sur l’Uni-
versité de Paris. Comment un parisien n’en serait-il pas ﬁer? Ses promoteurs les 
plus éminents ont été le picard Jean Buridan et le normand Nicole Oresme. Com-
ment un français n’en éprouverait-il pas un légitime orgueil? Il a resulté de la lutte 
opiniâtre que l’Université de Paris, véritable gardienne, en ce temps-là, de l’ortho-
doxie catholique, mena contre le paganisme péripaticien et néoplatonicien. Com-
ment un chrétien n’en rendrait-il pas grâce à Dieu?3
Elsewhere, Duhem created a link between John Buridan and his 
‘disciples’ Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony, at times including 
emon Judaeus and Marsilius of Inghen as well:
Le philosophe de Béthune [i.e., John Buridan] n’est pas seul à professer cette 
Dynamique; ses disciples les plus brillants, les Albert de Saxe, et les Nicole Oresme, 
l’adoptent et l’enseignent; les écrits français d’Oresme la font connaître même à 
ceux qui ne sont pas clercs.4
1) e opening sentence is inspired by Steven Shapin, e Scientiﬁc Revolution (Chi-
cago, 1996), 1.
2) Pierre Duhem, Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à 
Copernic, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913-1959), IX:697.
3) Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci. Ceux qu’il a lus et ceux qui l’ont lu, 3 
vols. (Paris, 1906-1913), 3:xiii-xiv. is passage is also quoted in English translation 
in H. Floris Cohen, e Scientiﬁc Revolution. A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago, 
1994), 53.
4) Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci, 3:viii. 
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In his view, these thinkers together constituted the Buridan school, 
which advocated a brand of French positivism.5
In an important article, published in 1991, John Murdoch exam-
ined the crucial role of Duhem’s work in shaping the historiogra-
phy of medieval science, either by extension or by criticism. He 
demonstrated how Duhem’s claims and the wealth of sources which 
he made available in French translation set the research agenda for 
historians of the next four decades or so.6 In addition, John Mur-
doch’s analysis illustrated that, as a matter of fact, Duhem’s thesis 
contained at least four diﬀerent ingredients. Only one of these con-
cerned the claim that Buridan’s mechanics was the larva which had 
been turned into adult form by Galileo Galilei. Or, in other words, 
that the essence of seventeenth-century science was already there in 
the fourteenth century.7
Many historians of science and philosophy have felt uneasy with 
Duhem’s interpretation of fourteenth-century natural philosophy as 
an anticipation of seventeenth-century mechanics. Early critics such 
as Anneliese Maier and Marshall Clagett believed that Duhem’s 
views were not justiﬁed by the medieval sources.8 However, the 
‘Buridan school’ had been born, for even Maier and Clagett did 
not question its existence and considered it the most prominent 
center of medieval science, together with the school of Bradwardine 
at Merton College. 
In a previous article I have argued that there are neither institu-
tional nor doctrinal reasons to conclude that there ever existed a 
Buridan school. Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony were not Buri-
dan’s students in any formal sense of the word. ey belonged to 
diﬀerent nations, whereas students usually took their degrees with 
masters of their own nation. In the case of Albert of Saxony, we 
5) See further, for instance, Duhem, Système du monde, VI:729.
6) John E. Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem and the History of Late Medieval Science and 
Philosophy in the Latin West,” in Gli studi di ﬁlosoﬁa medievale fra otto e novecento, eds. 
Ruedi Imbach and Alfonso Maierù (Rome, 1991), 253-302.
7) Duhem, Système du monde, VIII: 200: “La Mécanique de Galilée, c’est, peut-on 
dire, la forme adulte d’une science vivante dont la Mécanique de Buridan était la 
larve.” See also Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem,” 256-257.
8) Murdoch, “Pierre Duhem,” 274-279.
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even know that he took his degree in 1351 under master Albert of 
Bohemia.9 Moreover, the works by John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, 
and Albert of Saxony have, so far, not shown the type of uniﬁed 
doctrinal position which is usually taken as a characteristic of a 
school orthodoxy. In this respect, the so-called Buridan school is in 
stark contrast with, for instance, the omist or Scotist schools. 
For these reasons, it is time to depart from the traditional way of 
thinking about a Buridan school, and to try instead to picture it 
as an intellectual network or community. Its organizational base was 
the arts faculty at Paris. e university and the church supplied the 
social and material conditions for the existence of this network. At 
a micro-level, the contemporaneous intellectuals of this network 
engaged in speciﬁc social activities, such as lecturing on Aristotle’s 
texts and discussing. ey were focused on their own arguments, 
philosophical disagreements and conceptual language.10 eir intel-
lectual rivalry and opposition were focused on certain topics, such 
as, for instance, the ontological status of quantity.11 At the time, 
however, there was a fair amount of doctrinal agreement and of 
shared interest in certain philosophical issues and texts, in particu-
lar Aristotle’s Physics.12 Precisely this aspect of intellectual networks 
may have led previous historians to believe that there was a school 
of followers, clustered around a leader, John Buridan. Another fac-
tor may have been that previous scholars did not have the beneﬁt 
9) Henri Deniﬂe and Émile Chatelain, eds., Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Pari-
siensis, vol. I (Paris 1894), 149, 150 and 152 and further Johannes M.M.H. ijssen, 
“e Buridan School Reassessed, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony,” Vivarium 42 
(2004), 18-42, esp. 21, and 23-25.
10) Interesting sociological observations about intellectual networks can be found in 
Randall Collins, e Sociology of Philosophies. A Global eory of Intellectual Change 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1998), esp. 1-15 and 51-53. Collins’ analysis of the “Paris Net-
work” on 490-492 is outdated. 
11) ijssen, “Buridan School Reassessed,” esp. 29-38 discusses the rival positions 
which John Buridan and Albert of Saxony took in the debate about quantity. 
12) is aspect is nicely brought out in Edward Grant’s study of fourteenth-century 
commentaries on Aristotle’s De caelo. From his inventory and analysis of question-
titles it is clear that some masters at the arts faculty had shared philosophical interests, 
though not necessarily adhering to the same views. Edward Grant, Planets, Stars and 
Orbs. e Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687 (Cambridge, 1994).
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of the critical editions of some of the crucial texts, which can now 
be studied from this new perspective. 
In this paper I will attempt to give some more substance to the 
idea that John Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and Albert of Saxony con-
stituted an intellectual community or network, rather than a school. 
One of the topics that attracted the attention of this community 
was the nature of motion. In their question-commentaries on Aris-
totle’s Physics, all three thinkers are engaged in a debate about the 
question what motion really is. e dating of their commentaries 
is elusive. Elsewhere, I have suggested that Albert of Saxony’s Quaes-
tiones on the Physics, has to be placed inbetween John Buridan’s so-
called tertia lecture and the lectura ultima of his Quaestiones on the 
Physics. Albert knew Buridan’s tertia lectura. Buridan, in his turn, 
responded to Albert’s text in his own ultima lectura, written after 
the tertia lectura.13 is relative chronology, based on doctrinal ana-
lysis and text comparisons, ﬁnds support in independent evidence 
about the tentative dates of origin of these works. Buridan’s tertia 
lectura is dated around 1350, whereas the ultima lectura was com-
posed sometime between 1352 and 1357.14 Albert of Saxony’s Quaes-
tiones super libros Physicorum are to be dated after 1351. is date 
is suggested by one of its copies, whose introductory remarks tie 
the text to Albert’s opening lecture (principium) on Aristotle’s Phys-
ics.15 Since Albert of Saxony incepted in the summer of 1351, 
13) ijssen, “Buridan School Reassessed, 40-42. is relationship was previously sug-
gested by Jürgen Sarnowsky, Die aristotelisch-scholastische eorie der Bewegung. Stu-
dien zum Kommentar Alberts von Sachsen zur Physik des Aristoteles (Aschendorﬀ, 1989), 
50-51, and 58-60.
14) e evidence concerning the dates of composition of Buridan’s two question-com-
mentaries on the Physics was already known to Edmond Faral and Anneliese Maier. 
See further Johannes M.M.H. ijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de inﬁnito, Quaestiones 
super libros Physicorum secundum ultimam lecturam, liber III, quaestiones 14–19. An 
Edition with an Introduction and Indexes (Nijmegen, 1991), xx-xxi and Bernd Michael, 
Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner e-
orien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, 2 vols., (Ph.D. dissertation, Freie Universität 
Berlin, 1985), 2:606-608. 
15) It is the manuscript Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek, F. 345, which 
was written in 1360 in Cologne. Its incipit reads as follows: “Quoniam dicit Philosop-
hus ‘a communibus et prioribus prius est inchoandum’, ideo propter informationem 
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it seems that the Quaestiones on the Physics was the ﬁrst work that 
he read at Paris after the completion of his studies there. Nicole 
Oresme’s Quaestiones on the Physics are dated around 1347. is 
date is based on an argument ex silentio: after John of Mirecourt’s 
condemnation in 1347 which appeared to include the very charac-
teristic theory of modi rerum (about which more below), Oresme 
seems to have abandoned it.16 It is likely that Albert of Saxony used 
Oresme’s Quaestiones on the Physics in his own commentary on that 
text.17
What Kind of Entity is Local Motion?
In a seminal paper of 1978, John Murdoch and Edith Sylla pointed 
out that in the Middle Ages there was no “science of motion” as a 
separate discipline, in contradistinction to, say, optics or alchemy.18 
Motion and change play such a crucial role in Aristotle’s deﬁnition 
of nature that the medieval “science of motion” would actually 
intuicionemque iuvenum scolarium in isto primo libro tanquam pro principio meo volo 
istam questionem disputare: Utrum scientia....” See Sarnowsky, Die aristotelisch-scho-
lastische eorie der Bewegung, 18-19, and 49. e text may even imply that the ﬁrst 
quaestio harks back to Albert’s principium.
16) See Stefan Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles (Stut-
tgart, 1997), 29. An important qualiﬁcation has been added in Stefano Caroti, “‘Les 
modi rerum’... encore une fois. Une source possible de Nicole Oresme: le commentaire 
sur le livre 1er des Sentences de Jean de Mirecourt,” in Quia inter doctores est magna 
dissensio. Les débats de philosophie naturelle à Paris au XIVe siècle, eds. Stefano Caroti 
and Jean Celeyrette (Florence, 2004), 195-223. ere, Caroti demonstrates that Mire-
court’s 1347 condemnation was actually not aimed against the theory of modi rerum, 
but that it was merely implied, because Mirecourt mentioned it in his commentary on 
the Sentences. us, the theory came to be included in the condemned excerpts (arti-
culi).
17) Jürgen Sarnowsky, “Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony’s Commentary on the 
Physics. e Problems of Vacuum and Motion in a Void,” in Quia inter doctores est 
magna dissensio, eds. Caroti and Celeyrette, 161-175. 
18) John E. Murdoch and Edith Sylla, “e Science of Motion,” in Science in the 
Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), 206-265. Note that chapter 3 
(“e Philosophical Setting of Medieval Science”) by William A. Wallace in the same 
volume, refers to “Buridan’s pupils Albert of Saxony and Nicole Oresme” (113). 
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 coincide with Aristotelian natural philosophy.19 Hence, rather than 
 discussing the whole of medieval natural philosophy, the authors 
conﬁned themselves to certain areas regarding motion and change. 
One of the topics singled out was the problem of the nature of 
motion, which was of major concern to late medieval thinkers.20
As is well known, Aristotle had made contradictory statements 
concerning the ontological status of motion. In Physics, book III 
(200b32-201a10) he maintained that motion is not something over 
and above the things in motion. In other words, motion does not 
constitute a separate category, but belongs to the same category as 
what is gained by motion, i.e. the category of Place in the case of 
local motion.21 In the Categories (11b1-8), however, Aristotle had 
claimed that motion fell into the category of passio or Aﬀection. 
Averroes tried to reconcile these incompatible statements by point-
ing out that in the Physics, Aristotle had set forth the more correct 
view, whereas in the Categories, he had maintained the more com-
mon view. Averroes’s explanation of Aristotle’s view hinges on an 
analysis of motion from two diﬀerent perspectives. Motion, if con-
sidered from the terminus toward which it tends, only diﬀers from 
it in its degree of “more or less,” i.e. in its degree of perfection. If, 
however, motion is considered as a process (via) towards perfection 
or actuality, and, as a consequence, is diﬀerent from the perfection 
it attains, it belongs to a category of its own. When seen as a road 
towards actuality, motion cannot coincide with that actuality.22 e 
same twofold analysis of motion recurs in Averroes’s commentary 
19) Aristotle, Physics 192b9-193a30.
20) In addition to the section in Murdoch and Sylla, “Science of Motion,” 213-218, 
see especially Anneliese Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik (Rome, 1958), esp. 
61-143; Cecilia Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the irteenth Century (ca. 1250-1270). 
Motion, Inﬁnity, Place and Time (Leiden, 2000), esp. 37-86, and further Johannes 
M.M.H. ijssen, “e Nature of Change,” in e Cambridge History of Medieval Phi-
losophy, ed. Robert Pasnau, forthcoming.
21) In this paper, I will restrict myself to the medieval discussion of local motion 
(motus). Aristotle at times uses kinêsis (translated as motus in the Middle Ages) to cover 
change in general, and sometimes in the more restricted sense of motion, i.e., local 
motion.
22) Averroes, Physica in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis, IV (Venice, 1562-
1574; reprinted Frankfurt, 1962), bk. III text 4, f. 87ra-b. 
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on Physics V. ere it is couched in the terminology of change 
“according to matter” and “according to form.” According to  matter, 
change and its terminus belong to the same category; according to 
its form, one must view change as a transmutation that takes place 
in time and constitutes a category of its own, namely that of Aﬀec-
tion (passio).23
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these alternative ana-
lyses of motion came to be captured under the formulas forma ﬂu-
ens and ﬂuxus formae, a distinction that medieval authors usually 
attributed to Albert the Great.24 According to the forma ﬂuens  theory, 
change is nothing but the form successively gained by the change-
able body. In the case of local motion, the forma ﬂuens is the place 
successively attained by the mobile body. In other words, motion 
is the same as the perfection or form it acquires, but it represents 
that form in a state of ﬂux. It is important to note that the  ﬂowing 
character of the form is not posited in the form itself, but results 
from the degree of actualization of the form in the subject. us, 
the view of motion as forma ﬂuens did not contradict the common 
medieval view that forms are unchangeable.25 e ﬂuxus formae  theory, 
on the other hand, maintained that change is not the form acquired 
but is “the ﬂux” of that form– that is, the ﬂow, the process, or the 
road towards an actuality or perfection. ese distinctions lay, at 
least implicitly, in the background of fourteenth-century discussions 
of Aristotle’s statement that there is no change over and above real 
things.
Albert of Saxony provides a nice starting-point for mapping this 
debate. In book III, of his Questions on Aristotle Physics, he dis-
cusses whether local motion involves the existence of a ﬂux (ﬂuxus) 
23) Averroes, Physica, Bk.V, text 9, f. 215ra.
24) Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, Physica. Pars I, Libri 1-4, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster, 
1987), bk. III, tr.1 c.3, 151. See further Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, 
73-77 and E.J. McCullough, “St. Albert on Motion as Forma Fluens and Fluxus For-
mae,” in Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. J.A. Weis-
heipl (Toronto, 1980), 129-153, for a discussion of Albert’s views and of Maier’s 
interpretation thereof. 
25) See Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, 78-83.
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which is distinct from the mobile object and the place.26 Interest-
ingly, Albert divides his discussion over two questions, one dealing 
with the views of Aristotle and Averroes (III, q. 6), the other (q. 
7) dealing with the view according to faith and the truth (secun-
dum nostram ﬁdem et secundum veritatem). Both questions are inter-
twined in that certain arguments from q. 6 are only resolved at the 
end of q. 7.27 
Albert’s discussion of the views of Aristotle and Averroes is embed-
ded in a systematic survey of the several diﬀerent interpretations 
that were circulating. Apparently, some thinkers believed that Aris-
totle and Averroes adhered to a ﬂuxus theory; others believed that 
they did not hold a ﬂuxus theory: motus non est ﬂuxus. Albert him-
self is an advocate of the latter opinion. He too believes that accord-
ing to Aristotle and Averroes nothing more than mobile body and 
place are required to account for local motion. However, if motion 
is not a ﬂux additional to the mobile thing and the place, what, 
then, is it? Albert reviews two diﬀerent descriptions of local motion, 
before oﬀering his own. According to one description, being locally 
moved (localiter moveri) involves “continuously being in another 
way than before with respect to another body” (continue se habere 
aliter et aliter ad unum aliud corpus). is description of local motion, 
however, is inadequate, because it fails to distinguish between bod-
ies that are at rest and bodies that are in motion. For if a mobile 
body moves in relation to a body which is at rest, the body at rest 
too is in another way than before with respect to another body, 
namely precisely with respect to the body that is really moving.28
Others claim that being locally moved implies “being in another 
place than before” (ﬁat in alio loco quam prius). However, this descrip-
tion too is inadequate, according to Albert, for God could cause a 
body to be in one place, and then in another place without any 
26) Albert of Saxony, Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis Physicam ad Albertum de 
Saxonia attributae, ed. Benoît Patar, 3 vols. (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1999), 2:501-520.
27) e section ad rationes at the end of q. 7; Albert of Saxony, Expositio et Quaestiones, 
2:519, ll. 20-52 provides the resolution of the six arguments in oppositum put foward 
in q. 6, on 506 l. 78—507, l.12.
28) Ibid., 508, ll. 24-31.
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local motion taking place (for instance, by creating a body in one 
place and then putting it in another place).29
According to Albert, the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s and 
Averroes’s view on local motion entails that a mobile body “contin-
uously and successively is in another and another place” (continue 
et successive esse in alio et alio loco). is description is derived from 
a more general description of being moved (moveri) as “being con-
tinuously in another way than before” (continue aliter et aliter se 
habere quam prius). Note that Albert’s own interpretation of Aris-
totle and Averroes is a subtle modiﬁcation of the two rejected descrip-
tions of local motion. Positing an additional ﬂux is not necessary. 
Local motion is not essentialy diﬀerent from alteration, a type of 
change which only involves the mobile body and the forms succes-
sively acquired or lost.30
An important objection against Albert’s interpretation is that it 
does not seem to apply to the motion of the last sphere of the 
heaven. Since the last sphere is not surrounded by another body, 
and hence is not in a place, it could not be in motion according 
to the description advocated by Albert. He responds to this instance 
by pointing out that the last sphere, indeed, does not move locally 
in its totality (secundum se totam collective sumptam). It does move 
locally, however, with respect to its parts (ratione suarum partium), 
because they are continuously in another and another place.31
e local movement of the last sphere, and even of the entire 
universe, recurs in the next question (book III, q. 7). As a matter 
of fact, this question is entirely devoted to a consideration of the 
divine case that God would turn the universe into one continuous 
body and rotate it from East to West, or in some other way. In 
that case, local motion would, indeed, lack an external point of ref-
erence. So, if the universe moves, i.e. continuously is in another 
way than before, it can only be so because of something that is 
intrinsic to the mobile body and yet distinct from it. Albert  concludes 
29) Ibid., 508 l. 33: “Sed breviter ambo isti modi dicendi deﬁciunt.” e refutation fol-
lows on 508 ll. 33-509, l. 44.
30) Ibid., 508, ll. 18-23 and 509, ll. 45-510, l. 66.
31) Ibid., 510, ll. 67-511, l. 80.
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that this element which inheres in the mobile body is a ﬂux or the 
motion itself, which the mobile body successively acquires.32  Precisely 
as a ﬂux, the universe’s relation to it can be described as continu-
ously being in another way than before (aliter et aliter se habere).
e same position was defended by John Buridan. He too believes 
that local motion is a ﬂux intrinsic to the mobile body. Buridan 
develops his position in both question-commentaries on the Phys-
ics, in the tertia lectura (book III, q. 7) and in the ultima lectura 
(book III, q. 7). e diﬀerences between the two versions are min-
imal. e same arguments of the tertia lectura recur, in the same 
order, if not in the same wording, in the ultima lectura.33 In other 
questions, the diﬀerences between the two versions can be substan-
tial.34
An interesting contrast with Albert’s discussion is that Buridan 
is totally unconcerned with the correct interpretation of Aristotle 
and Averroes on the nature of motion. At the opening section of 
his own solution, he merely observes that the “philosophers of old” 
(antiqui) held no doubts about this question (i.e. the nature of 
motion). ey unanimously agreed that local motion was diﬀerent 
from the mobile body and the space traversed.35 If Buridan includes 
32) Ibid., 517, ll. 66-68: “Septima conclusio: in omni mobili quod movetur locali-
ter, volentes admittere casus divinos oportet ponere ﬂuxum seu motum inhaerentem 
mobili qui successive illi mobili acquiritur.”
33) I have checked the tertia lectura in the ms. Vat. Chig. E VI 199, fols. 43rb-44va 
against the edition of the ultima lectura, given below. One exception is the mention 
of two probabilities by which Buridan supports his main thesis: “Et pro conﬁmatione 
praedictorum possunt adduci aliquae probabilitates...” is passage was dropped in 
the ultima lectura. Another diﬀerence is the brief introductory phrase to Buridan’s own 
solution (determinatio): “Ista quaestio reputatur valde diﬃcilis et tenent moderni quod 
motus non sit res vel dispositio alia a mobili et loco vel aliis a duobus simul. Tamen 
contrarium videtur mihi.” ese diﬀerences were already noted by Maier, Zwischen 
Philosophie und Mechanik, 127-128.
34) ijssen, “Buridan School Reassessed,” 29-42 discusses the diﬀerences between the 
two versions with respect to quantity and impetus theory.
35) See the edition below, p. 205: “Antiquiores non dubitaverunt de ista quaestione, 
sed concorditer concesserunt motum localem esse aliam rem a mobili et loco, sed iam 
posteriores moderni propter rationes praedictas posuerunt quod motus non sit alia res 
a mobili.” Note the contrast with Buridan’s tertia lectura cited in the previous note, 
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Aristotle and Averroes among these antiqui, he is contradicting 
Albert’s assessment of their views. In any case, he too believes that 
local motion is a separate entity and thus disagrees with some pos-
teriores moderni, some more recent contemporaries. 
In order to bring out the true nature of local motion, Buridan 
invokes God’s power to move the universe. He couches his appeal 
to God’s omnipotence in a reference to Tempier’s condemnation, 
in particular to article 49.36 If it is conceded that God could indeed 
move the universe in rectilinear or circular motion, how should one 
imagine this movement? Buridan’s answer is clear: by admitting that 
motion is a quality inhering in the mobile body.37 In both his ques-
tion commentaries, John Buridan defends that local motion is a 
ﬂux intrinsic to the mobile body. More explicitly than Albert, Buri-
dan characterises this ﬂux as a quality or property of a mobile being, 
but of such a nature that it is purely successive. He believes that 
motion is a property, such as whiteness, and thus can maintain that 
supernaturally speaking there can be motion without anything mov-
ing, just as there can be whiteness without a white object.38 In other 
words, accidents can exists independently, if God so wishes. 
But can there be local motion without the existence of space 
(locus)? At ﬁrst sight, it seems that the local motion of the universe 
is something of a contradiction. e universe is not located in a 
space (locus), and yet can move locally. Buridan explains that the 
phenomenon of local motion is grounded in perception. In the 
common course of nature we perceive that a thing moves, because 
which contains no reference to the views of antiqui. Was this reference induced by 
Albert of Saxony’s discussion of Aristotle and Averroes?
36) See Roland Hissette, Ênquete sur les 219 articles condemnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 
(Louvain, 1977), 118.
37) See Buridan’s text which is edited below. Another passage in which Buridan indica-
tes that ‘being in motion’ is an accident of the mobile body, comparable to ‘whiteness’ 
is quoted by Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, 129: “...Nos autem dicimus 
quod omnis motus est subiective in mobili, scilicet in eo quod movetur, per realem 
inhaerentiam, sicut albedo esset in pariete.”
38) See the edition, p. 210: “<2> Ad aliam dico quod non plus reputarem impossibile 
quod esset motus et nihil moveretur vel mutaretur, quam quod esset albedo et nihil 
esset album. Neutrum est possibile naturaliter, et utrumque est possibile supernatu-
raliter.”
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there is a reference object with respect to which the motion takes 
place. us, we do not perceive the local motion of the universe, 
nor the movement of a boat next to another boat of the same veloc-
ity.39
As mentioned above, Albert of Saxony was familiar with Buri-
dan’s question-commentary. It is plausible that he derived the con-
sideration about God’s omnipotence to move the universe from 
Buridan’s tertia lectura and found the argument compelling. How-
ever, Albert provides this argument with a new context. He was 
quite satisﬁed with Aristotle’s and Averroes’s view that motion is 
not a ﬂux, if motion is described in the right way, i.e. as continu-
ously and successively being in another and another place. Even the 
local motion of the last heavenly sphere (which is not situated in 
a place), can be accounted for and does not require the assump-
tion of an additional ﬂux which inheres in the mobile body. When 
seen from the perspective of Aristotle and Averroes, local motion 
is not diﬀerent from alteration. Both types of change can be described 
as forma ﬂuens: in the case of alteration as the successive impres-
sion of a quality (for instance, heat) upon the changeable body, and 
in the case of local motion as the successive aquisition of various 
places by the mobile body. If, however, one introduces Buridan’s 
consideration of God’s motion of the entire universe into the debate, 
Albert apparently is convinced to accept the ﬂux theory. Alteration 
39) See the text below, p. 210: “Sed de hoc quod dicitur, quod implicat contradictio-
nem esse motum localem et non esse locum, ego dico quod motus ultimae sphaerae vel 
navis in ﬂuvio non dicitur localis quia necesse sit quod secundum illum mutetur locus, 
sed quia secundum communem cursum naturae omne quod movetur illo loco variat 
de facto habitudinem localem vel situalem ad aliquod aliud. Et omnino ille motus 
quem vocamus localem potest non esse localis, quia nullus mutaretur locus nec situs 
ad aliquam aliam rem, sed tunc non possem illum percipere. Non ergo vocatur motus 
localis, quia ad ipsum sit locus neccessarius, sed quia percipi non potest nisi appare-
ret mutatio loci vel situs rei ad aliam rem; unde existentes in navibus in mari velociter 
et simul motis non percipiunt quod illae moveantur.” e point about the perception 
of motion in two moving boats, also occurs in Oresme. See Stefano Caroti, “La posi-
tion de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement (Quaestiones super Physicam III, 
1-8): Problèmes gnoséologiques, ontologiques et sémantiques,” Archives d’histoire doc-
trinale et littéraire du moyen âge 61 (1994), 303-385, esp. 317 n. 51, and 314-320 for 
a discussion of the perception of motion according to Oresme. 
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and local motion can no longer be considered the same type of 
change, because the possible local motion of the universe requires 
the acceptance of a distinct ﬂux. In other words, for theological 
reasons, Albert shifts to a ﬂux theory of motion, and this ﬂux is 
explained in the same way as Buridan, i.e. as a inherent quality of 
the mobile object. 
Where now does Oresme ﬁt into this debate? In his question 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Oresme devotes book III, qq. 
2-7 to a discussion of the nature of motion.40 He examines ﬁve dif-
ferent views, before presenting his own theory. In his overview, 
Oresme presents himself as an advocate of the ﬂuxus theory. Yet, 
his view of the nature of ﬂuxus is entirely diﬀerent from that of 
Buridan and Albert of Saxony. He rejects the idea that the ﬂuxus 
is an inherent quality, such as a form. He disqualiﬁes this interpre-
tation of ﬂuxus as “the worst possible view” (omnium pessima). How 
then should the ﬂuxus be understood? Oresme introduces a new 
ontological entity, the modus rei or way of being, to explain the 
phenomenon of motion. Motion is nothing but the mode or con-
dition of the mobile object, i.e., its condition of traversing spaces 
in succession. e successiveness of the mobile body, however, should 
not be taken in the sense of a successive thing (res successiva) that 
is distinct from it.41 
40) I have used the edition in Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar. In the appa-
ratus, this edition indicates when it diverges from the edition in Caroti, “Position de 
Nicole Oresme,” 303-385.
41) e crucial texts are Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar, 228, ll. 90-94: “Ex 
predictis potest elici quinta opinio, scilicet quod motus est res successiva distincta sim-
pliciter a permanentibus. Et potest dupliciter intelligi: primo quod sit una res inhe-
rens signiﬁcabilis incomplexe, sicut una forma, et sic non est verum; secundo quod 
sit condicio vel modus ipsius mobilis, et sic est verum,” and further 234, ll. 147-156: 
“Alia, que ponit quod est ﬂuxus ad modum unius forme distincte, sicut esset albedo vel 
anima vel aliquod tale, est omnium pessima; tamen, si intelligatur quod non sit talis 
forma vel talis res, sed modus vel condicio ipsius mobilis, tunc est verissima et probabi-
lior et facilior inter omnes et concordat dictis Aristotelis et philosophorum.” e refu-
ted view resembles that of Buridan. See also Caroti, “La position de Nicole Oresme,” 
315. Note that Buridan compared ‘being in motion’ to accidents such as ‘whiteness,’ a 
view explicitly rejected by Oresme. See the text cited in note 37. 
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Oresme determines being moved (moveri) as continuously being 
in another way than the mobile object was before. Like Buridan 
and Albert, he insists that the mobile body is in another way with 
respect to itself, not in relation to an external point of reference. 
e considerations which lead Oresme to this description of motion 
sound familiar and rely on an analysis of the circular motion of the 
heaven and on alteration. If there were only one body, so Oresme 
argues, it could not move in a circular motion, unless one assumes 
that it is in another way than before with respect to itself. e same 
holds true for alteration, such as, for instance, the heating of water. 
e body in which the change takes place, is in another way than 
before with respect to itself.42
Conclusion: An Intellectual Community in Fourteenth-century 
Paris
Ideas do not beget ideas. Rather, they come into existence as a 
results of interaction between thinkers who are connected in intel-
lectual communities. One of the characteristics of such an intel-
lectual community is the gradual evolution of its own conceptual 
framework and the perspective it provides on its own problems and 
arguments. 
e debate about the nature of motion suggests that John Buri-
dan, Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony were members of such 
an intellectual community. eir discussion of the nature of motion 
42) Oresme reviews ﬁve diﬀerent descriptions of “being in motion” (moveri). Only the 
ﬁfth and last one has his approval: Kirschner, Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar, 231, ll. 
37-43: “Quinta est descriptio melior et vera quod ‘moveri’ est ‘aliter se habere conti-
nue quam ipsum mobile prius se habebat respectu sui et non respectu cuiuscumque 
extrinseci,’ et illa probatur, quia, si esset unum solum corpus, non videtur quin pos-
set moveri circulariter, et sic non se haberet aliter quam prius nisi respectu sui ipsius, 
et ita de alteratione quod, si non esset nisi unum corpus, adhuc posset alterari et cor-
rumpi, sicut aqua calefacta, et ad nihil aliud aliter se haberet.” From what follows, it 
is clear he was thinking of the heaven (caelum) and the cosmos (orbis). See ll. 52-54: 
“Ad secundum concedo quod partes talis mobilis, sicut partes celi et unius orbis, con-
tinue una se haberet ad aliam uno modo, non tamen ad se ipsam, nec similiter totum, 
et hoc satis patet de celo.”
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was cast in a shared conceptual framework. Being in motion was 
described as aliter et aliter se habere quam prius, and as ﬂuxus. e 
crucial issue in the debate came to be whether the local motion of 
the universe is comparable to other types of change, such as alter-
ation. Yet within this general framework, these thinkers took rival 
positions. Buridan and Albert of Saxony agreed that the ﬂuxus char-
acter of motion should be interpreted as an inherent quality or dis-
position (dispositio) of the mobile object. Although Oresme describes 
‘being in motion’ with a term that seems to approach dispositio, 
namely condicio or modus, his interpretation is completely diﬀerent. 
In his view, ‘being in motion’ is a state of being of the mobile 
thing, but adds nothing to it. As a matter of fact, in Oresme’s inter-
pretation the ﬂuxus is almost turned into a forma ﬂuens theory. is 
theory also receives much sympathy from Albert of Saxony. Accord-
ing to him, the forma ﬂuens theory was the theory genuinely advo-
cated by Aristotle and Averroes. Albert only gave it up for the ﬂuxus 
theory because he found Buridan’s arguments concerning God’s omni-
potence compelling. With more evidence culled from the commen-
taries on the Physics by John Buridan, Albert of Saxony and Nicole 
Oresme, and from other texts as well, we should eventually be able 
to map the inner structure of this intellectual community in four-
teenth-century Paris.
e Edition
In Book III, q. 7 of his Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, secun-
dum ultimam lecturam, John Buridan discusses the nature of motion. 
e text has not been edited before. Excerpts of the text were tran-
scribed and included by Anneliese Maier in her discussion of John 
Buridan’s views.43 Maier used the old printing of Paris 1509 mak-
ing corrections on the basis of the manuscripts Vat. Lat 2163 and 
2164.
e present edition of Buridan’s quaestio is based upon the man-
uscript København, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Ny kongelig Samling, 
cod. 1801 fol. (C). e Copenhagen manuscript has been fully 
43) Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, 121-130.
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 collated with the manuscript Cracow, Biblioteka Jagiellońska, cod. 
1771 (G). e text transmitted in C has been retained throughout. 
e use of the subjunctive in C is careless, or in any case, not 
according to classical usage. Yet it has not been corrected, except 
when readings of C are manifestly corrupt, in which case they have 
been corrected by G. e choice of C and G as base manuscripts 
for this edition is based on the analysis of the textual tradition and 
circulation of Buridan’s Quaestiones.44 
Punctuation and division into paragraphs are according to cur-
rent usage. e spelling has been homogenized according to classi-
cal standard orthography (as, for instance, codiﬁed in the Oxford 
Latin Dictionary). e medieval e for ae has not been retained, and 
u and v have always been distinguished. Variant readings of the 
type igitur/ergo, ille/iste, item/iterum have not been reported in the 
critical apparatus. 
ere is repeated evidence to the eﬀect that either the scribe of 
C had access to readings of other manuscripts, or that the manu-
script was corrected. Occasionally, C notes that another witness 
gives an alternative reading. ese references are introduced in the 
margin by the letters ‘al’ [alia lectio]. All these instances are included 
in the critical apparatus. Quite frequently, the scribe or corrector 
of C made corrections by way of deletions, interlinear, and mar-
ginal corrections. In those instances, the corrected reading of C has 
been taken into consideration for the edition, without indicating 
that this reading has been subject to correction. 
44) e results of the examination of the textual tradition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones 
super libros Physicorum, secundum ultimam lecturam (transmitted in 32 manuscripts), 
have so far been presented in Johannes M.M.H. ijssen, John Buridan’s Tractatus de 
inﬁnito (Nijmegen, 1991) and Dirk-Jan Dekker, De tijdﬁlosoﬁe van Johannes Buridanus 
(d. ca. 1360). Een historisch-wijsgerige studie met editie van Buridanus’ Quaestiones 
super octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (secundum ultimam lecturam), IV, 12-16 (Ph.D, 
dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen, 2003). e textual transmission will also 
be discussed in the Introduction to the forthcoming edition of books III and IV of 
John Buridan’s Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, secundum ultimam lecturam.
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<Quaestio 7. Utrum motus localis est res distincta a loco et ab eo 
quod localiter movetur>
Quaeritur septimo1 utrum motus localis est res distincta a loco et ab 
eo quod localiter movetur.
<Arguitur quod non>
<1> Arguitur quod non, quia si totum potest salvari sine re addita 
mobili et loco, frustra illa poneretur,2 et hoc est inconveniens; sed 
sine hoc possunt salvari. Probatio: quia esset motus localis si con-
tinue a mobile esset supra aliam et aliam partem spatii b, licet non 
poneretur aliud esse, et salvaretur successio et prioritas et posteri-
oritas per diversas partes spatii quae secundum situm habent ordinem 
et positionem circumscripto alio addito.
<2> Item. Sequeretur quod Deus potest separare et separatim 
conservare motum sine mobili et loco, immo ipsis annihilatis, quod 
videtur inconveniens, quia tunc esset motus et nihil moveretur.
<3> Item. Quomodo intenderetur velocitas motus, cum non rema-
neat pars prior cum posteriore? Et tamen sic debet ﬁeri intensio, 
scilicet per additionem partis ad partem remanentem in eodem 
subiecto.
<4> Item. Commentator et alii ponunt quod motus est de essen-
tia termini ad quem;3 et in motu locali terminus ad quem non est 
nisi locus qui acquiritur; ergo motus localis est de essentia loci.
<5> Item. Potest argui quod motus non esset. Sed hoc dictum 
est in alia quaestione,4 ideo dimitto.
<Oppositum>
<1> Oppositum arguitur, quia nec esse loci nec esse mobilis con-
sistit in ﬁeri, immo utrumque est perfecte factum, nisi sit aeter-
num; sed esse motus localis vel temporis consistit in ﬁeri aliud post 
aliud; ergo esse5 motus non |# est esse loci, vel eius quod movetur; 
1 quaeritur septimo] septimo quaeritur consequenter G. 2 poneretur] pon-
erentur C. 3 Averroes, In Physicam, VI, comm. 48, F. 4 Johannes Buri-
danus,  Quastiones super libros Physicorum, III, q. 6. 5 esse] ille C. # 72vb. 
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ergo non est de essentia alicuius eorum, nec per consequens est 
aliquid eorum. Consequentia patet, quia idem est esse hominis, 
essentia hominis et homo.6
<2> Item. Tam mobile quam locus est naturae permanentis; et 
motus non, sed naturae successivae.
<3> Item. Cum tempus sit motus, prout debet videri in quarto 
libro,7 si tempus non est mobile nec locus, sequitur etiam quod 
neque motus. Sed ego probo8 quod tempus non est mobile nec 
locus, quia dicit Aristoteles quarto huius9 quod nullae partes diver-
sae temporis simul sunt, nisi una includit aliam; sed mobilis et loci 
omnes partes simul sunt; igitur etc. 
<4> Item. In quolibet instanti temporis10 sempiternum est sphaera 
lunae et locus eius,11 cum numquam desinant; et in nullo instanti 
est motus, prout12 habetur in13 sexto14 huius;15 igitur etc. 
<5> Item. Arguitur quod motus non sit locus, quia motus est 
subiective in eo quod movetur, ut dicitur tertio huius;16 et non est 
locus in eo quod movetur, sed in locante forte quiescente. Etiam 
ultimae sphaerae est per se motus, immo primo, et eius non est per 
se locus. Immo vel ultimae sphaerae non est locus, vel ille secun-
dum Commentatorem17 est locus centri, et ille non est motus ulti-
mae sphaerae. 
<6> Item. Arguitur quod motus non sit ipsum mobile, scilicet 
quod movetur. Motus enim18 est actus ipsius mobilis, ut dicitur ter-
tio huius;19 et idem non est actus sui ipsius; igitur etc.20
<7> Item. Motus est in mobili subiective, ut dicitur tertio huius,21 
et idem non est subiective in se.
<8> Item. Cum locus qui acquiritur sit terminus ad quem et 
locatum sit mobile, manifestum est quod mobile non est de essen-
6 homo add. prout manifestari debet quarto  Metaphysicae G. 7 Aristoteles, Phys-
ica, IV, 10, 218a33-218b1. 8 probo] dico G. 9  Aris to teles, Physica, IV, 10, 
218a11-13. 10 temporis] tempus C. 11 eius] est G. 12 prout] ut G. 13 in 
om. G. 14 sexto] quarto C. 15 Aristoteles, Physica, VI, 3, 234a31. 16 Aristo-
teles, Physica, III, 2, 202a13-14. 17 Averroes, In Physicam, IV, comm. 43, fol. 142v 
G-H; IV, comm. 45, fol. 144r B; and VIII, comm. 84, fol. 432r E-F. 18 enim om. 
G. 19 Aristoteles, Physica, III, 2, 202a7-8. 20 igitur etc. om. G. 21 Aristoteles, 
Physica, III, 2, 202a13-14.
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tia termini ad quem; et tamen motus est de essentia termini ad 
quem22 secundum Commentatorem.23-24
<9> Item. Si terra moveretur sursum, non est verum quod ille 
motus sit illa terra, quia ille motus est innaturalis et violentus ipsi 
terrae; terra autem non est sibi ipsi25 innaturalis et violenta.
<10> Item. Sequeretur quod materia esset motus, si Deus eam 
solitarie moveret; et sic ipsa esset actus, quod est inconveniens.
<Quid nominis motus>
Antiquiores non dubitaverunt de ista quaestione, sed concorditer 
concesserunt motum localem esse aliam rem a mobili et loco, sed 
iam posteriores moderni propter rationes praedictas posuerunt quod 
motus non sit alia res a mobili. Sed26 ad videndum27 oportet sup-
ponere quid nominis, quia sine hoc non potest esse disputatio, ut 
patet28 quarto Metaphysicae, et in libro Posteriorum, et etiam in libro 
De sensu, ubi dicitur quod quid nominis est principium doctrinae.29 
Omnes ergo concedunt quod motus est mutatio quaedam, et mov-
eri mutari. Et in quinto huius30 dicit Aristoteles: “et est per se notum 
quod mutari est aliter et aliter se habere prius et posterius, vel saltem 
est prius aliqualiter se habere, et posterius taliter non se habere, aut 
e converso.” Unde Aristoteles dicit sic: “quoniam autem omnis muta-
tio est a quodam in |# quoddam (manifestat utique nomen. Post 
aliud enim aliquid et aliud31 quidem prius aliud autem monstrat 
posterius).”32 Et Commentator dicit sic: “hoc est per se manifes-
tum, quoniam dum res fuerit in eadem dispositione, tunc33 illic non 
erit transmutatio.”34
22 et…quem om. (hom.) G. 23 Commentatorem add. ergo etc. G. 24  Averroes, 
In Physicam, VI, comm. 48, F. 25 ipsi om. G. 26 sed] etiam G. 27  videndum 
add. de hoc G. 28 patet] apparet G. 29 non inveni. 30 non inveni. # 73ra.
31 et aliud om. CG. 32 Aristoteles, Physica, V, 1, 224b35. 33 Averroes, In 
 Physicam, V comm. 7, f. 211ra. 34 tunc] termini C.
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<Conclusiones>
Tunc ergo ego pono conclusiones.
<1> Prima35 est quod possibile est36 ultimam sphaeram moveri 
motu quo movetur sine loco. Probatur sic: quia, si ultima sphaera 
et alia ﬁerent unum continuum per potentiam divinam, ita quod37 
totus mundus esset unum corpus continuum, tunc nullus esset locus 
secundum Aristotelem,38 quia nulla esset superﬁcies corporis conti-
nentis divisi et tangentis. Unde Aristoteles ponit totum mundum 
non habere locum, nisi ratione partium, quarum una locat aliam, 
quia continet eam et est divisa ab ea et tangens ipsam;39 hoc enim 
requiritur ad hoc quod sit locus. Unde, si Deus omnia corpora anni-
hilaret praeter istum lapidem, ipse40 lapis non amplius esset in loco. 
Et tamen illo casu posito adhuc esset possibile quod Deus moveret 
simul circulariter totum mundum. Hoc probo per quendam artic-
ulum Parisius condemnatum,41 in quo dicitur quod Deus non potest42 
movere simul totum mundum motu recto (error). Et non est ratio 
quare magis posset movere ipsum motu recto, quam motu circu-
lari.
Item. Sicut motu divino movet omnes sphaeras caelestes simul 
cum ultima sphaera, ita potest43 omnia alia, scilicet inferiora, vol-
vere simul. Et si ipse possit44 omnia volvere simul, cum modo45 sint 
ad invicem discontinuata, non minus hoc potest,46 si essent facta 
unum continuum. Ergo potest47 totum mundum movere, licet non 
esset locus. 
Item. Oporteret48 concedere, si totus mundus esset unum con-
tinuum, quod Deus extra posset formare unum granum milii tan-
gens illum mundum, et quod illo grano milii formato quiescente 
Deus potest49 sic volvere illum mundum quod continue alia et alia 
pars eius tangeret illud granum milii;50 et tamen illo posito ille 
35 prima add. conclusio G. 36 est] esset G. 37 quod] ut G. 38 secundum Aris-
totelem om. G. 39 Aristoteles, Physica, IV, 5, 212b8-11. 40 ipse] iste G. 41 See 
Roland  Hissette, Ênquete sur les 219 articles condemnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277 (Lou-
vain, 1977), 118. 42 potest] posset G. 43 potest]  posset G. 44 possit] potest 
G. 45 modo] non G. 46 potest]  posset G. 47 potest] posset G. 48 opor-
teret] oportet G. 49 potest] posset G. 50 milii om. G. 
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 mundus non haberet aliquem locum. Et etiam, si Deus illo grano 
formato posset sic volvere illum totum mundum,51 ita posset sine 
illo.52 
<2> Secunda conclusio est53 quod ultima sphaera non solum ex 
eo movetur quod se habet continue aliter et aliter ad ipsam ter-
ram,54 vel ad aliquod aliud corpus. Probatio: quia non minus mov-
eretur, si omnia alia volverentur cum illa55 sine alio motu eorum;56 
et tamen tunc non se haberet per talem motum aliter et aliter |# 
ad57 ali quod aliud corpus.
Item. Non minus oportet se habere aliter et aliter quod movetur 
motu recto, quam quod movetur circulariter. Et tamen ad moveri 
recte non oportet se habere aliter et aliter ad aliud corpus, quia si 
a Deo totus mundus moveretur simul motu recto, non propter hoc 
se haberet aliter et aliter ad terram, licet quiesceret sicut nunc habet, 
scilicet58 si terra volveretur. Ergo ex aliter se habere ad terram non 
sequitur quod moveatur. Ideo non solum ex eo movetur quod aliter 
se habet ad terram vel ad aliud corpus, quoniam ita diceremus de 
alio corpore, sicut diximus de terra.
Item. Sequeretur quod ex motu deformi terrae vel partium eius 
ultima sphaera deformiter et irregulariter moveretur, quod est fal-
sum. Consequentia patet, quia ex tali motu irregulari terrae vel par-
tium eius ultima sphaera deformiter et irregulariter se haberet ad 
terram aliter et aliter. 
<3> Tertia conclusio est59 quod ultimam sphaeram moveri est 
eam intrinsece aliter et aliter se habere prius et posterius. Probo, 
quia per quid nominis ‘moveri’ est aliter et aliter se habere prius et 
posterius;60 et tamen moveretur, licet non se haberet aliter et aliter 
prius et posterius ad aliquod extrinsecum, ut apparuit per conclu-
siones praecedentes;61 ergo etc. 
Sed aliqui respondent quod moveri est aliter et aliter se habere 
ad aliquod quiescens, aut simpliciter, si aliquid quiescit, aut sub 
51 illum totum  mundum] totum mundum istum G. 52 illo add. grano 
G. 53 est om. G. 54 terram om. C. 55 illa] ea G. 56 eorum] earum C. # 
73rb. 57 ad] et G. 58 scilicet] sicut C. 59 est om. G. 60 probo…posterius] 
probatur ipsam moveri est eam se aliter et aliter habere ut patet ex quid nominis 
in marg. G. 61 Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, III, q.7, 
concl. 1-2. 
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condicione quia, si aliquid quiesceret, se haberet ad illud aliter et 
aliter. Sed ista evasio nihil valet, quia possibile est quod ultima spha-
era moveretur de facto, licet nihil de facto quiesceret; ergo ipsa 
nullo modo se haberet de facto aliter et aliter ad aliquod quiescens 
nec ad aliquod extrinsecum. Ergo si non se haberet aliter et aliter 
intrinsece, ipsa nullo modo se haberet aliter et aliter de facto, ideo 
nullo modo mutaretur de facto. Nam ad mutari requiritur aliter et 
aliter se habere simpliciter de facto, et non solum sub condicione.
Item. Numquam habitus debet describi per privationem sibi opposi-
tam, immo oportet quod ﬁat e converso. Sed iste terminus ‘qui-
escere’ est privatio opposita huic termino ‘moveri’; ergo mala est 
descriptio dicens et declarans quid nominis ‘moveri’ quod moveri 
sit aliter et aliter62 se habere ad aliquod63 quiescens. Nam loco huius 
termini ‘quiescens’ pono eius descriptionem, tunc idem omnino 
describeretur per se ipsum, scilicet sic: “moveri est aliter et aliter se 
habere ad illud quod est aptum natum moveri et64 |# non movetur,” 
et hoc est manifeste65 inconveniens.
<4> Quarta conclusio est66 quod motus ultimae sphaerae non est 
sphaera illa, nec locus eius. Primo manifestum est quod non est 
locus eius, quia possibile est quod moveretur, licet non haberet 
locum, ut dictum est;67 et quia, si habet locum, tamen ille est divi-
sus ab ea, motus autem eius non est divisus ab ea, cum dictum sit 
quod ipsa intrinsece aliter et aliter se habet.68 Etiam69 nec ille motus 
est illa sphaera, quia ut70 dictum fuit in quaestione de distinctione 
ﬁgurae a ﬁgurato,71-72 non est imaginabile vel possibile quod aliq-
uid se habeat aliter quam se habebat ante, nisi hoc sit ad73 aliquod 
extrinsecum, vel nisi hoc sit propter aliquod74 esse quod ante non 
erat, aut non esse quod ante erat; sed duo primi modi non habent75 
locum in motu ultimae sphaerae, ut patet ex dictis; ergo oportet 
concedere tertium modum, et tamen quantum ad substantiam 
62 et aliter om. (hom.) G. 63 aliquod om. G. 64 et rep. C. # 73va. 65 manifeste] 
manifestum C. 66 est om. G. 67 Johannes Buridanus, Quastiones super libros 
Physicorum, III, q. 7, concl. 1. 68 Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros 
 Physicorum, III, q. 7, concl. 3. 69 etiam] sed etiam G. 70 ut] sicut G. 71 a 
 ﬁgurato] ad ﬁguratum G. 72 Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super libros Physico-
rum, II, q. 3. 73 ad om. G. 74 aliquod] aliquid G. 75 habent] habet G. 
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ultimae sphaerae nihil est quod non esset ante, et nihil erat ante 
quod non sit modo; ergo aliud a sphaera est quod ante non76 erat, 
vel e converso, et hoc non est nisi motus vel partes eius, igitur 
etc. 
Item. Motus ultimae sphaerae non est mutatio eius substantialis, 
nec in ordine ad aliquod extrinsecum, nisi hoc acciderit77 ad aliud 
aliter se habere intrinsece, ut praedictum est. Ergo est mutatio secun-
dum dispositionem aliam a substantia sphaerae et sibi inhaeren-
tem.
Item. Aliter et aliter se habet intrinsece. Ergo est alteritas alicuius 
ab aliquo intrinsece; et non substantiae sphaerae ad se ipsam cir-
cumscripto omni alio; ergo est alia dispositio, et illa est motus 
eius.
<5> Quinta conclusio est quod motus ultimae sphaerae est dis-
tinctus ab ultima sphaera et a loco eius, si habeat locus: quia est, 
et non est hoc nec illud; ergo etc.
<6> Sexta conclusio est quod motus ultimae sphaerae est res pure 
successiva, cuius scilicet est pars prior et pars posterior non manen-
tes simul, quia si esset res permanentis naturae, tunc secundum 
illam ultima sphaera non se haberet aliter et aliter prius et poste-
rius plus, quam secundum eius magnitudinem, vel ﬁguram, vel alia 
eius accidentia permanentia, quod est falsum.
<Ad rationes >
Tunc igitur respondendum est ad rationes.
<1> Ad primam manifestum est quod sine dispositione superad-
dita78 non potest79 salvari quod ultima sphaera se habeat aliter et 
aliter intrinsece, sicut se habet.
<2> Ad aliam80 dico quod non plus reputarem impossibile81 quod 
esset motus et nihil moveretur vel mutaretur, quam quod esset albedo 
et nihil esset album. Neutrum est possibile naturaliter, et utrumque 
est possibile supernaturaliter. Sed de hoc quod dicitur, quod impli-
76 non] nec G. 77 acciderit] exciderit G. 78 superaddita]  habita G. 79 potest] 
possit G. 80 aliam] secundam G. 81 impossibile om. G. # 73vb.
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cat contradictionem esse motum localem et non esse |# locum, ego 
dico quod motus82 ultimae sphaerae vel navis in ﬂuvio non dicitur 
localis quia necesse sit quod secundum illum mutetur locus, sed 
quia secundum communem cursum naturae omne quod movetur 
illo loco variat de facto habitudinem localem vel situalem ad ali-
quod83 aliud. Et omnino ille motus quem vocamus ‘localem’ potest84 
non esse localis, quia nullus mutaretur locus nec situs ad aliquam 
aliam rem; sed tunc non possem illum percipere. Non ergo voca-
tur motus ‘localis’ quia ad ipsum sit locus neccessarius, sed quia 
percipi non potest85 nisi appareret mutatio loci vel situs rei ad aliam 
rem; unde existentes in navibus in mari velociter et simul motis 
non percipiunt quod illae moveantur.
<3> Ad aliam dictum fuit prius quod forma ita bene86 reddere-
tur intensa, si plures gradus vel maiores gradus generarentur simul, 
sicut si generarentur unus prius et alter posterius cum permanen-
tia eorum. Modo a fortiori lucido et87 fortiore motore ceteris par-
ibus generarentur plures gradus simul luminis vel velocitatis et maiores, 
quam a debilibus; ideo esset intensius lumen et intensior veloci-
tas.
<4> Ad aliam dicitur quod termini intrinseci, qui sunt de nec-
cesitate motuum quos vocamus ‘locales’, non sunt loca, sed sunt 
partes extremae illorum motuum, sicut partes extremae lineae sunt 
termini lineae.
<5> Ad aliam88 rationem responsum fuit in alia quaestione.89
Haec de quaestione.
82 motus add. alias locus sup. lin. (a.l.) C. 83 aliquod] aliquid G. 84 potest] 
posset G. 85 potest] posset G. 86 forma ita bene] ita bene forma G. 87 et add. 
a G. 88 aliam] ultimam G. 89 Johannes Buridanus, Quastiones super libros Phys-
icorum, III, q. 6.
